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Abstract:  
Recent writings concerning measurement of political democracy offer sophisticated discussions 
of problems of conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation. Yet they have less to say 
about the error that derives from the use of inaccurate, partial, or misleading data sources. Draw-
ing on evidence from five Central American countries, the authors show this data-induced mea-
surement error compromises the validity of the principal, long-term cross-national scales of 
democracy. They call for an approach to index construction that relies on case expertise and use 
of a wide range of data sources, and they employ this approach in developing an index of 
political democracy for the Central American countries during the 20th century. The authors’ 
index draws on a comprehensive set of secondary and primary sources as it rigorously pursues 
standards of conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation. The index’s value is 
illustrated by showing how it suggests new lines of research in the field of Central American 
politics. 
Keywords: democracy; regime indices; measurement; Central America; data sources 
 
Article: 
To date, most scholars address the challenge of measuring political democracy by focusing on 
three methodological issues: the conceptualization of democracy through the formulation of 
explicit definitions, the operationalization of these definitions through the construction of 
specific measures, and the aggregation of these measures into overall country scores through 
specified rules (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; see also Adcock & Collier, 2001; Bollen, 1980, 
1990; Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Schmitter 
& Karl, 1991). 
 
In this article, we argue that a different and more basic problem threatens the validity of existing 
over-time indices of democracy: data-induced measurement error. This kind of error occurs 
when analysts incorrectly code cases because of limitations in the underlying data on which they 
                                                 

 AUTHORS’ NOTE: For support of our crucial early meetings, we thank the Latin American Studies Program, 
Wesleyan University; the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology; and the 
Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. Evelyne Huber, Scott Mainwaring, and the anonymous 
Comparative Political Studies reviewers provided constructive written comments. The second author is grateful to 
the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for support; the third author acknowledges the support of the National 
Science Foundation (Grant No. 0093754). 
rely as description of empirical reality. Typically, data-induced measurement error grows out of 
the use of inaccurate, partial, or misleading secondary sources. Although analysts acknowledge 
and briefly discuss this kind of problem (e.g., Bollen, 1990; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002), its 
consequences remain underappreciated. We suggest that data-induced measurement error may be 
the most important threat to the valid measurement of democracy. We further propose that the 
remedy to this problem involves the use of area experts in the coding of cases. Our claim is that 
area expertise greatly helps researchers plumb the accuracy of sources, pass judgment on meager 
or contradictory findings, and locate new raw data—essential measurement tasks that existing 
indices often fail to accomplish. 
 
To develop this argument, we focus on the five countries of Central America during the 20th 
century: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. The Central American 
region is well suited for our purposes for three reasons. First, each of us has conducted research 
in and about the region during the past decade. From this experience, we are in a good position to 
explore the difference that case familiarity can make when coding democracy measures. Second, 
as Brockett (1992) suggests, gross and systematic errors have appeared in the codes for the 
Central American countries in previous large-N data sets. Third, the substantial cross-national 
and longitudinal variation in political democracy among the Central American countries makes 
this a useful region for exploring the concrete effects of data- induced measurement error on 
research findings concerning patterns of democratization. 
 
Through an analysis of the Central American countries, we show that the principal, long-term 
cross-national scales of democracy—the Gasiorowski (1996), Polity IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 
2002), and Vanhanen (2000) indices—are often inaccurate, a result that we also believe applies 
to indices that classify democracy for shorter periods of time. Although the reasonably high 
positive correlations among these and other indices suggest that they are reliable, we argue that 
miscoding derived from limited knowledge of cases may threaten their validity to a degree 
greater than the more commonly discussed problems of conceptualization, operationalization, 
and aggregation. 
 
The inconsistency among the different over-time indices motivates our effort to construct a new 
index for the Central American countries between 1900 and 1999. To create this index, we draw 
on the full range of available secondary sources in English and Spanish, including difficult to 
obtain monographs published in the isthmus and rarely cited doctoral dissertations. When these 
sources are incomplete or contradictory, we turn to local newspapers, government documents, 
and U.S. diplomatic correspondence to determine whether, for example, an election was rigged 
or foreign intervention made a mockery of popular sovereignty. 
 
Our index focuses on five dimensions of political democracy: broad political liberties, 
competitive elections, inclusive participation, civilian supremacy, and national sovereignty. We 
derive these dimensions by operationalizing Bollen’s (1990) general conceptualization of 
political democracy. Each of the five dimensions is then treated as a necessary condition for 
political democracy. With this framework, we do not use standard additive approaches for 
coding and aggregating dimensions. Instead, we offer a new approach that relies on fuzzy-set 
rules for coding and aggregating necessary conditions (see Ragin, 2000). We suggest that this 
alternative orientation can productively redirect future efforts to measure democracy. Moreover, 
we show how our index helps to set new research agendas in the field of Central American 
politics. 
 
EVALUATING LONG-TERM INDICES OF DEMOCRACY 
There are important conceptual and methodological differences across the three leading long-run 
scales of democracy: Mark Gasiorowski’s (1996) regime typology classification, the Polity IV 
data set (by Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Gurr; see Marshall & Jaggers, 2002), 
and Tatu Vanhanen’s (2000) index of democracy. Given such differences, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the scales produce contradictory findings about levels of democracy in Central 
America. In this section, however, we explore the extent to which these differences might be best 
explained in terms of data- induced measurement error. 
 
BASIC PROPERTIES 
Although democracy is an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956), many political scientists 
believe that for empirical purposes, the term should be defined minimally and procedurally. A 
common definition of political democracy is, roughly, ―fully contested elections with full 
suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, 
including freedom of speech, assembly, and association‖ (D. Collier & Levitsky, 1997, p. 434). 
In addition, many analysts add the criterion that elected governments must have effective power 
to govern. Austere definitions such as these facilitate causal analysis by treating excluded 
potential attributes (e.g., public policies, socioeconomic factors) as potential causes or 
consequences of democracy. 
 
Debate, however, exists about how to operationalize democracy and aggregate individual 
measures into overall scores. For example, Gasiorowski (1996, p. 471) disaggregates democracy 
into three dimensions: (a) competition, (b) participation, and (c) civil and political liberties. He 
measures democracy directly in light of these three features rather than further disaggregating 
them, a decision that Munck and Verkuilen (2002, p. 20) argue creates measurement problems. 
In Gasiorowski’s approach, a democratic regime is defined by high levels across all three 
dimensions. By contrast, a semidemocratic regime has a substantial degree of political competi-
tion but restricts competition or civil liberties. For semidemocratic regimes, Gasiorowski also 
seems to add a new dimension focused on whether elected officials have the capacity to govern. 
Although it is not entirely clear, a country appears to be coded as authoritarian if it lacks 
competition or if it excessively limits participation and/or liberties. 
 
In contrast, the Polity IV index views democracy in light of two very broad dimensions: 
democracy and autocracy (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002). Each of these broad dimensions is then 
operationalized by five more specific measures: competitiveness of political participation, 
regulation of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of 
executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. The dimensions are coded along an 
ordinal scale that reflects assumptions about their relative weight. In turn, the weighted scores for 
measures are summed together to arrive at an aggregate 10-point scale for the two broad 
dimensions. Polity IV then combines both dimensions into a final –10 to +10 score by 
subtracting autocracy from democracy. 
 
Vanhanen’s (1997; 2000) definition of democracy is similar to many others, but he 
operationalizes it by using two indicators that are measured along an interval scale: degree of 
participation (percentage of total population that votes) and competition (percentage vote for 
minority parties). These percentages are multiplied and then divided by 100 for a final 
democracy score. For example, National Liberation Party (PLN) presidential candidate José 
Figueres won the 1953 Costa Rican elections with 62.5% of the vote and 20.7% of the total 
population having voted. The democracy score is computed as 37.5 (100 – 62.5) * 20.7 / 100 = 
7.76. While acknowledging that his procedures may not be able to pick up differences between a 
mildly authoritarian regime and a harsh authoritarian one, Vanhanen (1997) argues that ―it is 
better to use simple quantitative indicators with certain faults than more complicated measures 
loaded with weights and estimations based on subjective judgments‖ (p. 37). 
 
THE RELIABILITY OF THE SCALES 
A reliability test among these scales produces an important puzzle. Although the scales are 
highly correlated among all countries, they are often only weakly correlated among the Central 
American cases. Moreover, correlations indicate that error is nonsystematic, which suggests that 
coders end up measuring very different things. 
 
Repeated tests have established a high degree of correlation between existing indices, even as 
each employs its own indicators and aggregation properties. A recent example comes from 
Vanhanen (2000, pp. 259-263), who compares his index of democracy with Polity and Freedom 
House scores. The correlations average .785 for index of democracy and Polity (combining 
Polity’s democracy and autocracy scores) from 1909 to 1998 and .823 for index of democracy 
and Freedom House from 1978 to 1998. Given the differences in conceptualization, 
operationalization, and aggregation in these three scales, the high correlations appear to be quite 
striking (see also Hadenius, 1992, pp. 159-162; Przeworski et al., 2000, pp. 56-57). 
 
Yet these indices disagree about how to code the Central American cases. Table 1 presents the 
simple correlations between the three scales for the 20th century. Nicaragua is the only country 
with high agreement. For the other four countries, the mean average of the 12 pairwise 
correlations is .42. Moreover, the correlations are even lower for the period from 1900 to 1949; 
the mean average of the 15 correlations (including Nicaragua) for the three scales for the first 50 
years of the 20th century is .22. 
 
One might argue that low correlations among scales stem from one ―bad‖ index, a weakness that 
evaporates between two ―better‖ indices. However, no evidence of this is apparent from the 
correlations. Indeed, for Costa Rica (1900 to 1999), Vanhanen (2000) and Gasiorowski (1996) 
classifications are correlated at .78, whereas Vanhanen and Polity IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 
 
2002) exhibit the lowest correlation at .03. Yet for El Salvador, this pattern is reversed. Polity IV 
now has the highest correlations (.67 with Vanhanen and .52 with Gasiorowski). The Vanhanen 
and Gasiorowski indices have the lowest correlations for El Salvador. Vanhanen’s index is part 
of three of the five highest correlations per country and also part of the four lowest correlations. 
 
There are also many periods with particularly wide disparities. To present these disparities, we 
first standardize the three scales to a 0 to 20 index. Vanhanen’s (2000) highest democracy scores 
for Central America are close to 20, with Costa Rica averaging 19.997 for the 1965 to 1998 
period. So although the Vanhanen scores could potentially go much higher, we do not alter these 
scores. For the Polity IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) scores, we create the customary summary 
measure by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score for a –10 to +10 scale and 
then adding 10 points for a final 0 to 20 index. We convert Gasiorowski’s (1996) categories in 
the following way: 0 for authoritarian, 10 for semidemocracy and transitional regimes, and 20 for 
democracy.
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 The Vanhanen (2000) data set ends in 1998, the Gasiorowski (1996) data set ends in 1992, and the Polity IV data 
(Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) go through 1999. For comparisons, we extend the last year of data for Vanhanen and 
Gasiorowski through 1999. 
 
We then identify country-years in which there is at least a difference of 10 points between any 
two of the three scales. These are the years with no reasonable consensus, or highly disputed 
years. The results are presented in Table 2. For Nicaragua, major disagreement exists for only 10 
years. But El Salvador and Guatemala have at least triple that number of years in sharp dis-
agreement, at 30 and 36, respectively. And Honduras and Costa Rica have by far the largest 
numbers of contested years, with 49 and 58 (out of 100), respectively, even though they have far 
fewer highly disputed scores after 1963 (only 2 years between them). Indeed, there is at least one 
difference of 10 points or more between the three scales for 73% of the years 1900 to 1963 in 
Honduras and 100% of the years 1900 to 1957 for Costa Rica. 
 
These inconsistencies also appear in indices that cover particular years during the post–World 
War II period. For example, Bollen’s (1990) 0 to 100 scale for 1960 codes Guatemala as 69.8, 
higher than El Salvador (53.5) and about the same as Honduras (70.1). By contrast, we believe 
that Honduras was more democratic than Guatemala at this time and that El Salvador was at least 
as democratic as Guatemala. The Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) index for 1985 gives Honduras 
its highest ranking for all indicators, yet we believe the country was only a semidemocracy 
during this time. Likewise, we contend that this scale overstates differences in the quality of 
elections in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1965. The Arat (1991) index for 1948 to 1982 fre-
quently overestimates the extent of democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala when compared to 
Honduras. Finally, the Hadenius (1992) index for 1988 significantly underestimates the level of 
democracy in Nicaragua when compared to the rest of the region. 
 
We would suggest two explanations. First, high agreement among existing scales is a product of 
important numbers of stable autocracies and democracies. There is little disagreement that most 
advanced capitalist countries have been democratic and many African and Asian countries have 
been consistently authoritarian. Agreement about a large percentage of the cases fuels the high 
correlations, suggesting higher levels of scale reliability than actually exist. Second, existing 
indices get the facts wrong for an important set of cases that contain quite a few countries whose 
regimes are often in ―purgatory‖—regimes with often shifting authoritarian and democratic 
characteristics. As we shall see, classifying correctly these transitional cases is hard because of a 
paucity of credible accounts about the character of their politics. 
 
THE CAUSES OF UNRELIABILITY 
We are arguing, then, that the low correlations among indices for the Central American countries 
are primarily driven by different understandings of the empirical facts. To take perhaps the most 
telling example, Polity IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) gives Costa Rica a perfect democracy 
score every year between 1900 and 1999. The erroneous idea that Costa Rica has been demo-
cratic since 1889—one made official by President Oscar Arias in 1989 when he celebrated the 
centennial of Costa Rican democracy—can be found not only in travel guides but also in 
scholarly writing and reference books (e.g., Dyer, 1979). 
 
Assessing the accuracy of claims about a century-old democracy in Costa Rica requires taking 
the time to read more than the most superficial sources. Moreover, painting a reasonably accurate 
portrait of politics for each specific year in modern Costa Rican history requires reading Spanish-
language secondary sources, local newspapers, government documents, and U.S. diplomatic 
correspondence, as well as interviewing local experts and eyewitnesses (Bowman, 2002; 
Lehoucq, 1992; Lehoucq & Molina, 2002). This is how we find that between 1900 and 1955, the 
opposition launched 16 coups against the central government, largely in response to incumbents 
attempting to impose their successors five times on the presidency (Lehoucq, 1996). Conducting 
fine-grained research allows one to recognize, for example, that the minister of defense, Federico 
Tinoco, overthrew his predecessor, Alfredo González, who himself became president in 1914 as 
a result of an extraconstitutional compromise and without even having run an election campaign 
in the hotly contested 1913 general elections (Murillo Jiménez, 1981). In short, knowledge about 
Costa Rican history leads one to reject Polity IV’s (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) classification of 
this country, even if one accepts the underlying properties of the scale. 
 
A major discrepancy between the indices concerns the ―start‖ of democracy in Costa Rica, a fact 
indispensable for identifying the causes of democracy. Vanhanen’s (2000) scale suggests the 
origin of a least semidemocracy is 1914. Before this time, Vanhanen scores the percentage of the 
Costa Rican adult population voting as close to 0 in the presidential elections, which results in a 
final democracy score of 0 for these years. This scoring is, however, simply wrong. There were 
approximately 21,401 votes cast in 1901; 38,329 in 1905; and 54,279 in 1909. The source of the 
problem may be that until 1913, Costa Rican elections were indirect (Molina, 2001; Oconitrillo 
García, 1982), just as they still are in U.S. presidential elections. Because Vanhanen’s (p. 254) 
index does not punish the United States for having an electoral college, we can conclude only 
that this is also inappropriate for Costa Rica, where the number of electors was erroneously 
entered into the data set. Factual errors such as these in Vanhanen’s ―objective‖ index likely 
apply to a number of cases within Latin America (Seligson, 1997, pp. 280- 282). 
 
Another example of disagreement—Nicaragua during the 1920s and early 1930s—makes the 
point that scarcity of information may prevent the straightforward coding of a case that possesses 
characteristics of both dictatorship and democracy. The Polity IV data set (Marshall & Jaggers, 
2002) codes the entire 1920s and early 1930s in Nicaragua as at least partially democratic, 
whereas the Gasiorowski (1996) index sees the same period as completely authoritarian. For its 
part, Vanhanen’s (2000) scale classifies the period as exhibiting very low levels of democracy 
until the elections of 1928, after which semidemocracy exists until 1935. Why do these scales 
reach such different conclusions? 
 
In large part, disagreement between scales stems from overly general and, therefore, unhelpful 
secondary sources. Ciro Cardoso’s (1986) chapter in the Cambridge History of Latin America, 
for example, barely analyzes the politics of these years. Like many other secondary sources (e.g., 
Pérez-Brignoli, 1989; Woodward, 1976), Cardoso’s discussion does little more than mention the 
intense rivalry between Liberal and Conservative parties that characterized Nicaraguan politics 
during these years. Few researchers made much use of Dana Munro’s (1918) classic account of 
these years or the U.S. Department of State’s (1932) detailed study, both of which analyze 
Conservative party hegemony since the U.S.-sanctioned fall of Liberal President José Santos 
Zelaya in 1909. U.S. intervention is a key event in Nicaraguan political history because after 
promoting power-sharing agreements between both parties, the United States sent marines to 
Nicaragua to quell Liberal insurrections in the 1920s, which only fueled Liberal Augusto César 
Sandino’s guerilla movement against U.S. meddling in national affairs. Reliance on these general 
accounts (the best regionwide account for the politics of this period is Taracena Arriola, 1993) 
leaves the analyst with little choice but to speculate about the effects of U.S. occupation and the 
quality of elections during this time. 
 
In this case, the Vanhanen (2000) scale actually best measures the level of democracy. Yet to see 
why, one must go beyond the two quantitative measures Vanhanen offers. The U.S. Department 
of State (1932), Munro (1964), and Dodd (1992) suggest that before 1928, presidential control of 
registration, balloting, and vote tallying in the context of a polarized party system made elections 
largely ceremonial affairs that did little more than circulate power among incumbent—in this 
case, Conservative—party factions. In the elections of 1920, for example, these abuses include 
reports of ballot box stuffing, army intimidation of voters, the Conservative government’s 
manipulation of the final vote count, and the certification of the final vote by Congress, where 
Conservatives held a comfortable majority of seats. Although the final official count gives the 
Conservatives 59,000 votes and the Liberals 28,000, the U.S. diplomat thought a fair election 
would have been too close to call (Munro, 1964, p. 423). Hence, there is strong reason to believe 
that in the absence of fraud, a different outcome would have occurred. 
 
In contrast, the U.S.-supervised elections of 1928 and 1932 do represent a real advance for the 
quality of democracy (Dodd, 1992; Munro, 1964). Unlike previous elections, these contests were 
competitive and peaceful, with fewer reports of procedural abuses. In fact, the elections were the 
first in Nicaraguan history in which the winner could not be predicted in advance. We hesitate to 
classify this period as ―democratic,‖ given that some abuses were still reported and that without 
the United States, the competing parties likely would not have consented to fair competition. 
Nevertheless, the period from 1929 until the rise of the Somoza regime can be considered more 
democratic than recognized by, for example, the Gasiorowski (1996) index. 
 
We see less disagreement among the scales for El Salvador during the first three decades of the 
20th century. Although we believe that their authoritarian coding is correct, we are unsure how 
Gasiorowski (1996), Polity IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002), and Vanhanen (2000) reach this 
conclusion because secondary sources simply do not discuss the politics of the period. At best, 
the Polity IV and Gasiorowski indices rely on country overviews by Browning (1971), White 
(1973), and Lindo-Fuentes (1990) that say very little about political competition. None of these 
authors appears to have consulted Spanish-language sources, such as Figeac (1952), Flores 
Macal (1983), and Menjívar (1980), or even Wilson’s (1970) doctoral dissertation. A close look 
at these sources suggests that the case might just as easily have been coded as semidemocratic, 
but—and this is our central point—no one really knows because of the absence of information 
about the electoral processes during the first decades of the 20th century. 
 
To code El Salvador, we read a broad array of secondary sources, including little-known works 
in Spanish and more recently completed books and doctoral dissertations (e.g., Ching, 1997; 
Lauria-Santiago, 1999; Samper Kutschbach, 1994). This alternative literature suggests that the 
socioeconomic structures of El Salvador before 1930 were much more like those of Costa Rica 
than the traditional historiography allows. Indeed, if the traditional historiography had 
mischaracterized the socioeconomic conditions of El Salvador, perhaps it also was wrong about 
political conditions in this country. 
 
To settle this crucial issue, we read the primary sources about this period, especially the typically 
helpful (and rarely used) U.S. diplomatic records (U.S. Department of State, 1968, 1879-1906, 
1910-1914). We find convincing evidence that the traditional historiography was correct in its 
interpretation of the period. For example, we discover that Salvadoran presidents during the early 
20th century often picked their successors after close consultation with U.S. advisors, that the 
recorded votes of certain locations were not actually cast because political bosses submitted the 
votes for entire towns, and that violence was widespread during elections. 
 
Scrutinizing the existing cross-national regime classifications suggests that scoring cases is far 
from straightforward. Placing them in categories presupposes a mastery of secondary sources. It 
demands judgment, especially when available information is fragmentary and contradictory. As 
our discussions of the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan cases suggest, thoroughness is the only way 
to score many cases accurately. Our discussion of El Salvador points out that classification may 
require uncovering new material and scrutinizing old sources to be able to discuss meaningfully 
a case about which little is actually known. 
 
A NEW DEMOCRACY INDEX: CENTRAL AMERICA, 1900 TO 1999 
In light of the data-driven inconsistencies of existing scales, we develop a new index of political 
democracy for the five Central American countries. Table 3 contains the five dimensions that we 
use to code cases: broad political liberties, competitive elections, inclusive participation, civilian 
supremacy, and national sovereignty. In this section, we discuss these dimensions alongside the 
issues of conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation. 
 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
We conceptualize democracy at the highest level of abstraction using Bollen’s (1990) definition. 
According to Bollen, democracy is 
 
the extent to which the political power of elites is minimized and that of nonelites is 
maximized. By political power I am referring to the ability to control the national 
governing system. The elites are those members of society who hold a 
disproportionate amount of the political power. These include the members of the 
executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government as well as leaders of 
political parties, local governments, businesses, labor unions, professional 
associations, or religious bodies.... It is the relative balance between elites and 
nonelites that determines the degree of political democracy. (p. 9) 
 
From our perspective, Bollen’s definition has the distinct merit of being consistent with a wide 
range of operational definitions. Indeed, it avoids the temptation of including directly operational 
measures in the actual conceptualization of democracy. 
 
OPERATIONALIZATION 
Operationalization is the process through which a concept is disaggregated into measures that 
can be coded. It is distinct from the process of actually scoring cases, which involves matching 
empirical data to the specific measures, and which may itself require further disaggregation (see 
Adcock & Collier, 2001). Our operationalization of democracy again builds on Bollen’s (1990) 
work, which sees democracy as encompassing two dimensions: political liberties and political 
rights. These dimensions are designed to gauge the relative political power of elites and 
nonelites. Political liberties refer specifically to the extent to which individuals have the freedom 
to express opinions in any media and the freedom to form and participate in any political group. 
Political rights refer to the extent to which the national government is accountable to the 
population and each individual is entitled to participation in the government either directly or 
through representatives. 
 
We treat political liberties as one measure of democracy; by contrast, we derive four distinct 
measures from the dimension of political rights (see Figures 1 and 2). In making this choice, we 
follow much of the political science literature, which sees political liberties as a single measure 
and political rights as encompassing a range of measures. It is worth noting that the best level at 
which one should code dimensions is almost never discussed in the literature. Our view is that 
one should code at any level at which conceptually critical dimensions are found, even if this 
means coding dimensions that fall at different levels (e.g., the dimension of political liberties is 
at a higher level vis-à-vis the concept of democracy than the other four dimensions). 
 
It is necessary to disaggregate further to actually score cases on the dimension of political 
liberties. Figure 1 suggests that political liberties embody two components: organization and 
expression. In turn, both organization and expression can be disaggregated into constituent 
attributes that can be more directly observed. For example, with organization, we observe 
whether the state prevents citizens from forming political parties, unions, and interest groups. 
Likewise, with expression, we observe whether the state prevents the expression of political 
views in the media and through other channels. 
 
Bollen’s (1990) second dimension of political rights corresponds to four of our coded 
dimensions: competitive elections, inclusive participation, civilian supremacy, and national 
sovereignty (see Figure 2). To arrive at these measures, we first disaggregate political rights into 
two elements: access to power and accountability of government. Access to power refers to the 
way 
 
in which political elites gain control of government. This element is primarily concerned with the 
quality of elections. Accountability of government examines how political elites, once in power, 
carry out policies and make decisions. This element is concerned with the extent to which elites 
actually follow constitutional guidelines once in office and are permitted to do so by other 
powerful actors such as the military. 
 
Access to power and accountability of government then are further disaggregated into four of our 
coded dimensions. Following Dahl (1971), we see two main dimensions associated with access 
to political power: the competitiveness of elections and the inclusiveness of participation. For the 
purpose of scoring cases, competitive elections can be disaggregated into legal procedures (i.e., 
the fairness of the legal rules that govern elections) and electoral practices (i.e., the degree to 
which electoral rules are followed). Inclusive participation refers to the extent to which citizens 
are legally entitled to vote, and cases can be scored on this dimension by examining the content 
and enforcement of suffrage laws as well as the percentage of the population that actually casts 
legitimate ballots. 
 
The other element of political rights—accountability of government— disaggregates into our 
final two measures: civilian supremacy and national sovereignty. Cases are scored on civilian 
supremacy by observing evidence such as extent to which the military uses extraconstitutional 
means to constrain elected officials. Cases are coded for national sovereignty by observing the 
extent to which foreign powers constrain elected officials and directly determine the content of 
public policy. 
 
AGGREGATION 
Most indices of democracy assume that a high score on one measure can at least partly 
compensate for a low score on another indicator. This assumption is built into all aggregation 
procedures that use an additive approach, even those with weighted measures. 
 
Yet we believe that approaches that view indicators as substitutable attributes are limited. For 
example, the presence of highly competitive elections cannot compensate for the complete 
absence of inclusive participation. Rather, if few citizens can participate in an electoral process, 
it makes little difference if the process is otherwise fair. Likewise, even if all citizens can 
participate in an electoral process, it makes little difference if the process is completely unfair. 
The removal of either of these attributes cancels out the presence of the other; the average of the 
two is meaningless. 
 
We see the five dimensions outlined above as necessary conditions for democracy. The 
conditions must be strongly present for a case to be considered a democracy; if any one of them 
is absent, the case cannot be considered a democracy. In addition, we view the five conditions as 
jointly sufficient for democracy. This means that when all five are strongly present, we consider 
the case to be a democracy. 
 
Aggregation approaches that treat the defining attributes of democracy as a group of necessary 
conditions that are jointly sufficient are rarely used and almost never explicitly identified as such 
in the literature (but see Munck & Verkuilen, 2003; Przeworski et al., 2000, pp. 19-22). 
Moreover, no existing index develops methods for working with aggregation rules based on 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Here we draw on logical procedures from fuzzy-set analysis 
(see Ragin, 2000). 
 
We code the five attributes for each country-year using a three-value system: 1.00, .50, and 0.00. 
The 1.00 value corresponds to more or less full membership in a given dimension, the .50 value 
represents a crossover case that is partially in and partially out of a given dimension, and the 0.00 
code represents a case that is more or less outside of a given dimension. 
 
To receive a value of 1.00 on a dimension, a country must meet the following general thresholds: 
 
1. Broad Political Liberties: No evidence that state actors systematically prevent citizens from 
forming political parties, unions, and interest groups; likewise, no evidence that state actors 
systematically prevent the expression of political views in the media. 
2. Competitive Elections: Elections are regularly and constitutionally held with proper 
candidate selection, secret ballot, and one vote per person. No reports of significant fraud, 
intimidation, or violence. 
3. Inclusive Participation: The constitution formally establishes universal suffrage rights for 
all adults. A significant portion of the eligible population casts legitimate ballots. 
4. Civilian Supremacy: No evidence that the military uses extraconstitutional power to 
constrain the authority of elected civilians; likewise, no evidence that elected officials 
systematically violate their legal spheres of authority. 
5. National Sovereignty: No evidence that foreign actors directly determine the content of 
major public policies; likewise, no evidence that foreign actors shape major domestic 
policies by threatening to overthrow the domestic government.
2
 
When a country does not meet the threshold for full membership on a given dimension, it is 
coded as either .50 or 0.00. In our framework, a country receives a .50 code on a dimension if it 
meets the following general thresholds: 
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  It is understood that international financial organizations, private investors, and advanced industrial countries 
place enormous constraints and pressures on developing countries. Likewise, past agreements with other nations will 
restrict policy options in the future. No country has the autonomy to enact economic policies without consequences 
from financial markets and pressures from foreign powers. 
1. Broad Political Liberties: Evidence may suggest that the state restricts some forms of 
political organization, but important and large segments of the population are still free to 
establish political groups, unions, and parties. Likewise, evidence may suggest that the state 
obstructs the presentation of some opposition views in the media, although the media is still 
largely open to diverse opinions. 
2. Competitive Elections: Elections are regularly and constitutionally held with legitimate 
candidate selection, secret ballot, and one vote per person. There may be some reports of 
fraud, intimidation, or violence, but these allegations are not greater than the margin of 
difference between winners and losers. 
3. Inclusive Participation: Suffrage rights encompass at least a broad spectrum of the male 
population, such that most middle-class and working-class men can vote. A significant 
portion of the eligible population casts legitimate ballots. 
4. Civilian Supremacy: Evidence may suggest that the military uses extraconstitutional power 
to constrain elected officials on certain political issues. Likewise, evidence may suggest that 
elected officials violate their legal spheres of authority, although these spheres of authority 
are still generally respected. 
5. National Sovereignty: Evidence may suggest that foreign actors directly determine public 
policy on certain issues, although the domestic authorities still have enough autonomy to 
shape policy decisions and sometimes override foreign pressures. No reports that external 
actors shape policy by threatening to remove the domestic government. 
If a country does not meet these diminished thresholds, it receives a value of 0.00 for a given 
dimension. Thus the 0.00 code acts like a residual category in that not passing the 1.00 and .50 
thresholds on a given dimension results in a 0.00. 
 
To aggregate dimensions into overall scores for democracy, we follow the rules of fuzzy-set 
logic, which are specifically designed for the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions (see 
Ragin, 2000). Because each condition is necessary for democracy, a case (i.e., a country-year) 
receives an aggregate score equal to its lowest score across the five dimensions. For example, if a 
given case has scores of 1.00, 1.00, 1.00, .50, and 0.00 on the five dimensions, it receives a score 
of 0.00 for democracy, because this is the lowest value among the scores. To receive an overall 
score of 1.00, the country must have a score of 1.00 for each of the five dimensions, given that 
these dimensions are necessary for democracy. A case will receive a value of .50 when it 
receives at least one .50 code and does not receive any 0.00 codes. This approach assumes that a 
case is only as strong as its weakest attribute. The mathematical underpinnings of this 
assumption stem from the use of the logical ―and‖ in fuzzy-set inference: the logical ―and‖ is 
accomplished by taking the minimum membership score among intersecting sets (see Ragin, 
2000, pp. 173-174; see also Goertz & Starr, 2003). 
 
This fuzzy-set approach leads us to measure democracy on a level similar to both nominal 
trichotomous measurement and ordinal three-value measurement. Thus we can refer to three 
types of regimes—democratic, semi- democratic, and authoritarian—and to three different levels 
of democracy. More generally, the appropriate level of measurement for democracy hinges on 
the goals of specific research (D. Collier & Adcock, 1999). Hence, we do not assume that our 
level of measurement is inherently superior or inherently inferior to alternative levels. 
 
THE BLM INDEX OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
The appendix offers our index—what we call the BLM index of Central America. It provides the 
0.00, .50, or 1.00 code for democracy for each country-year. The scores for the five underlying 
dimensions that were aggregated are provided on our Web site 
(http://www.blmdemocracy.gatech.edu/). Some of the more important primary and secondary 
sources used to generate these codes are available as country bibliographies at the same Web 
site. 
 
In constructing this index, at least two of the three authors of this article reviewed each country-
year. Disagreements arose regarding the codes for several particular measures, and these 
differences generally reflected either a limitation in the measure or a limitation in an author's 
knowledge of the facts. If the problem was with the resolving power of a measure, we sought to 
better define the measure until a consensus could be reached.
3
 If the problem arose not because 
of the measure but rather because of divergent understandings of the empirical facts, we 
reviewed all evidence and argued about the facts. In some cases, these arguments motivated one 
or more of us to pursue new primary research as we sought to "defend" our interpretation of 
events. In the end, this sometimes painstaking process allowed us to reach full consensus on the 
500 country-years and 2,500 measures covered in the index.
4
 
 
PATTERNS IN THE DATA 
Table 4 reports the correlations between the BLM index and the other three indices during the 
20th century. The mean correlations for all five countries during the century are .47 with Polity 
IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002), .51 with Gasiorowski (1996), and .53 with Vanhanen (2000). 
The correlations for the first 50 years (1900 to 1949) are considerably lower than for the second 
50 years (1950 to 1999) in 13 out of 15 cases (save Polity IV and Vanhanen for Guatemala). 
Indeed, the BLM index is negatively correlated with other indices in 4 of the 15 paired 
comparisons for the 1900 to 1949 period. This trend is to be expected, as quality English-
language secondary sources are especially scarce for the early 20th century. 
 
Because we have data for all five underlying dimensions, it is possible to make generalizations 
about specific combinations that produce semidemocracy and authoritarianism. Four patterns 
may be noted here. First, no authoritarian country-year is scored a 1.00 on four dimensions and a 
0.00 on only one dimension. Rather, all authoritarian country-years receive less than 1.00 on at 
least two dimensions. Hence, there are no examples of authoritarian regimes in Central America 
that are fully democratic except on a single dimension. 
 
                                                 
3
 Thus we moved back and forth between the case data and the development of our measures. When a measure led 
to a score that seemed problematic in light of what we knew about the case, we were willing to revisit the measure 
and sometimes refine it to fit the specific context. Our belief is that this kind of mutual adjustment or "iterated 
fitting" is more likely to produce accurate results than approaches that fail to make corrections for poor linkages 
between concepts, indicators, and scores (see Adcock & Collier, 2001). 
4
 The fact that we sometimes committed errors in our initial coding of cases suggests that the final BLM index is not 
infallible; we do not claim to have completely avoided data-induced measurement error, only to have substantially 
reduced it when compared to existing data sets. 
 
Second, among authoritarian country-years with a single 0.00 code, the most common dimension 
to receive the 0 code is competitive elections (28 years), followed by broad political liberties (9 
years), civilian supremacy (4 years), and national sovereignty (2 years).
5
 Inclusive participation 
is at least partly present (i.e., coded .50 or 1.00) for all country-years, such that no case is 
authoritarian because of suffrage/participation limitations alone. 
 
Third, among semidemocratic regimes with a single .50 code and four 1.00 codes, the cases fall 
into distinct groups. In Costa Rica, the absence of inclusive participation during two decades 
(i.e., 1928 to 1947) in the first half of the century made this country a semidemocracy, even 
though suffrage rights were universal for all males, an uncommon characteristic at the time for 
competitive political systems (Lehoucq & Molina, 2002). During the late 20th century, the 
inability of civilians to exercise full power vis-a-vis the military was responsible for a 
semidemocracy in Honduras (1991 to 1996) and Guatemala (1994 to 1999). Restrictions on 
political liberties made Nicaragua a semidemocracy under the Sandinistas (1985 to 1989) and 
during the Figueres administration in Costa Rica (1951 to 1957). No period was a 
semidemocracy by virtue of a single .50 code on either competitive elections or national 
sovereignty. 
 
The fact that many semidemocracies are not full democracies because of shortcomings on a 
single dimension suggests that one might wish to classify these country-years using specific 
subtypes of democracy (see D. Collier & Levitsky,1997). In Costa Rica from 1928 to 1947, 
when suffrage was diminished, one might refer to a ―limited democracy.‖ For late-20th-century 
Honduras and Guatemala, where civilian supremacy was not fully present, one might refer to 
―guarded democracies.‖ And for cases such as Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, where political 
liberties were restricted, one might refer to ―restricted democracies.‖ All these types are 
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  The country-years in which only competitive elections receive a 0 code are Costa Rica (1900 to 1902;1907 to 
1908), El Salvador (1927 to 1930), Guatemala (1920 to 1926;1944), and Honduras (1927 to 1928;1935 to 1937;1949 
to 1955). The cases completely missing only broad political liberties are El Salvador (1984 to 1991) and Nicaragua 
(1936). The cases completing missing only civilian supremacy are El Salvador (1964 to 1966) and Costa Rica 
(1948). The cases completely missing only national sovereignty are Honduras (1900 to 1901). 
semidemocracies, but the specific label underscores the particular dimension that is not fully 
present. 
 
Finally, all five dimensions play a unique role in leading at least some cases to be coded as either 
a semidemocracy or an authoritarian regime. However, the number of country-years for which a 
single dimension is decisive in determining the .50 or 0.00 code are not evenly distributed. From 
a total of 500 country-years, the breakdown is as follows: broad political liberties (16 years), 
competitive elections (28 years), inclusive participation (20 years), civilian supremacy (16 
years), and national sovereignty (2 years). The complete absence of competitive elections is 
especially important in moving cases from semidemocracy to authoritarianism (see also 
Lehoucq, 2004). The partial absence of inclusive participation was critical in moving Costa Rica 
from democracy to semidemocracy in the first half of the 20th century. The inclusion of the 
national sovereignty dimension changes the scoring of only Honduras from 1900 to 1901 (which 
otherwise would have been semidemocratic). 
 
BLM VERSUS DATA SET OF MAINWARING, BRINKS, AND PÉREZ-LIÑÁN (MBP) 
As a final illustration that the principal threat to democracy scales is data- induced measurement 
error and not conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation properties, we present a brief 
comparison with the MBP (Mainwaring, Brinks, & P~rez-Linan, 2001) data set. MBP argue 
cogently for remarkably similar conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation rules. 
They disaggregate democracy into four components that correspond closely with four of our five 
components (only the national sovereignty dimension is not covered). Although MBP do not 
explicitly base their aggregation rules in the logic of fuzzy-sets and necessary conditions, the 
aggregation mechanics are the same. Moreover, MBP have substantial expertise about the region 
and time frame of their index: Latin America from 1945 to 1999. Given these similarities, one 
would expect their scale to be highly correlated with our index for the 1945 to 1999 period. 
 
The pairwise correlations are as follows: Costa Rica .59, El Salvador .73, Guatemala .96, 
Honduras .77, and Nicaragua .94. Thus the correlations for Costa Rica, El Salvador, and 
Honduras reveal discrepancies. Given the methodological similarities between our scales, these 
differences are almost certainly rooted in contrasting understandings of the reality of Central 
America. 
 
It is difficult to evaluate the source material used by MBP (2001), as there is no documentation 
in their article. Comparing discrepant years between BLM and MBP, however, reveals some 
obvious and some not-so-obvious coding errors. For example, MBP code Costa Rica 
semidemocratic from 1945 to 1948 and fully democratic from 1949 to 1999. We would disagree. 
The Revolutionary Junta of the Second Republic governed the country for 18 months after 
winning power through a civil war in 1948. By MBP’s own rules, this could not reach the level 
of a semidemocracy. In addition, archival research and other primary source research establish 
that electoral fraud, political violence, political persecution, and restrictions on competition were 
much higher from 1953 to 1958 than conventional wisdom holds (Bowman, 2001). The president 
of the country between 1949 and 1953 (Otilio Ulate) was likely not the winner of the 1948 
elections (Lehoucq & Molina, 2002, pp. 218-222). 
 
Honduras is another useful comparison. MBP (2001) score Honduras a semidemocracy from 
1949 to 1954. There is some good evidence for this. The long-serving dictator Tiburcio Carfas 
resigned the presidency in January 1949. His successor, Juan Manuel Galvez, allowed greater 
opposition, freer speech, and some labor organization, and he oversaw the strengthening of the 
state apparatus (Argueta,1990, p. 76). Stokes (1950) expressed hope that the stability established 
under Carfas would lead to the emergence of a rural democracy in the country. LaFeber (1984) 
notes that under Galvez, ―Honduras became more pluralistic and dynamic than ever before‖ (p. 
132). And Martz (1959) asserts that President Galvez was one of the most democratic leaders in 
Central America, ―one of the very, very few‖ (p. 129). Given these sources, one is tempted to 
give Honduras the benefit of the doubt and code it as semidemocratic during the Galvez years. 
 
However, both the MBP (2001) and the BLM indices agree that in the complete absence of free 
and fair elections, a country can be neither a democracy nor a semidemocracy. And the 1948 
Honduran elections were a complete farce. The opposition candidate fled the country, and with 
good reason. Carfas rigged the elections in favor of his vice president: 
 
Juan Manuel [Galvez] is the most honorable and honest man in my government. He is the 
only one to whom I can confer the power to soften the bitterness caused by my long term in 
the Presidential House; he is going to grasp a hot coal in his hands, which he will have to 
put out little by little. This is the only way to save the democratic institutions, the interests 
of the country, the lives and belongings of all of you. This is why I have arranged for him to 
arrive without obligations to the Presidency of the Republic. You should respect my decision 
made for the good of Honduras. (Carfas, as quoted in Argueta,1990, p. 75) 
 
Galvez not only took office in the absence of competitive elections but also legitimized the coup 
that replaced him. He abandoned the country after the 1954 elections that favored the opposition, 
returning as president of the Supreme Court following the coup by his vice president (Julio 
Lozano). 
 
In short, the discrepancies between our scale and the MBP (2001) scale are almost certainly a 
product of the use of different information sources, which in turn generates different 
understandings of the reality of Central America. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND EXPLANATION 
The new codes offered in the BLM index have important implications for understanding Central 
American politics and for testing explanations more generally. Here we briefly examine how our 
data lead to new lines of research on the region. 
 
THE DEMOCRATIC OPENING OF THE LATE 1920s AND EARLY 1930s 
Our data show that the late 1920s and early 1930s was a period of political opening for much of 
the region. Incumbents and their opponents developed semidemocracies in Guatemala (1927 to 
1930), Honduras (1929 to 1934), and Nicaragua (1929 to 1935)—the first nonauthoritarian 
regimes in the histories of these countries. Costa Rica was already semidemocratic by the 1920s. 
Incumbents began permitting a free press to operate in El Salvador between 1927 and 1931, but 
they did not quite make the breakthrough to holding competitive elections (Wilson, 1970). This 
regionwide opening is little known and rarely analyzed; it cannot even be discerned from 
existing indices of democracy. 
 
What caused this movement toward democracy? And why did it come to an abrupt end? 
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to develop a full answer, we note that a structural 
hypothesis suggests that this period overlaps 
with the rise of reform movements that emerged from the great export expansion of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries (e.g., Mahoney, 2001; Taracena Arriola, 1993). These reform 
movements were based in urban sectors that prospered from commercial activities and export 
enclaves. Elsewhere in Latin America, R. B. Collier and D. Collier (1991) argue that it was 
precisely these commercial sectors—along with manufacturing groups and sometimes working 
classes—that reformed the state at the beginning of the 20th century. Another, more actor-
centered hypothesis would argue that breakthroughs to democratic rule are a product of strategic 
stalemates in which no political force can use military force to crush its rivals. With the partial 
exception of Costa Rica, Central American politicians had been unwilling to relinquish the use of 
force in political competition (Munro, 1918). 
 
The demise of Central America’s early democratic experiment also allows us to revisit the debate 
regarding the effect of the Great Depression in Central America. Analysts such as Baylora-Herp 
(1983) argue that the depression produced brutal reactionary dictatorships in Central America, 
whereas others, such as Woodward (1976), argue that it did not lead to a fundamental regime 
change in the region. A structural hypothesis suggests that the depression undermined the 
position of urban sectors that led the charge for democracy in the 1920s, allowing authoritarian 
reversals to take place. Although we cannot evaluate this hypothesis here, the timing of the 
collapse of the Central American economies and the demise of the democratic opening is at least 
suggestive, even though economic crisis seems to have had no impact on the continued 
democratization of Costa Rican politics. Our point, however, is that only good data about the 
timing of the early democratic opening and closing in the region permit speculation about such 
links. 
 
QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 
The central empirical contribution of our data set involves better understanding the political 
reality of Central America. Beyond that, if the data set were used in statistical tests that sought to 
explain a somewhat larger range of countries, such as those of Latin America, the new scores we 
offer could have an important effect on findings. For example, some scholars argue that the 
relationship between economic development and democracy within Latin America does not 
follow the worldwide trend and, thus, that the Latin American countries can be usefully analyzed 
on their own terms (e.g., Mainwaring, 1999; Mainwaring & Perez-Linan, 2003). The simple 
correlation between level of economic development and democracy in 1990 for the 20 Latin 
American countries is –.18 using Polity IV data (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) to measure 
democracy.
6
 By contrast, when the BLM codes are introduced to replace the Polity IV codes for 
the five Central American countries, the correlation becomes a flat 0. Although the magnitude of 
change is not dramatic, it can nevertheless affect one’s conclusions. Moreover, if scholars 
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 Economic development is defined as GDP per capita, and data are derived from Mark 6.1 of the Penn World 
Tables (Heston, Summer, & Aten, 2002). We define Latin America as the 18 Spanish-speaking countries of the 
hemisphere plus Brazil and Haiti. 
generate new scores for other Latin American countries, which currently may not be adequately 
measured in the most popular large-N data sets (see Seligson, 1997), the change may become 
quite significant. 
 
We believe it is an open question whether new and better indices for a broader range of countries 
would alter established cross-national relationships that are intended to apply to all countries in 
the world. On one hand, the most robust relationships may be relatively impervious to even 
extensive changes in coding. For instance, even if all the countries of Latin America were to 
have completely different democracy scores, the central findings of large-N research on 
economic development and democracy would remain unchanged.
7
 On the other hand, changes in 
democracy scores based on expert coding would likely affect long-term, large-N studies 
concerning less robust relationships, such as democracy and inequality, or democracy and 
political violence. The magnitude of these changes would depend on the degree to which the 
measurement problems we describe apply to a large range of countries. 
 
There are good reasons to believe that data-induced measurement error does apply to a 
considerably larger range of countries, especially those that share three features characteristic of 
Central America. First, ―small countries‖ may be subject to the measurement error discussed 
here because they do not attract significant scholarly attention, even though they are a majority 
of all countries. Stereotypes concerning the character of their politics are often prevalent in the 
literature, and these stereotypes provide a weak basis for coding democracy measures. Second, it 
is hard for nonspecialists to classify ―transitional countries‖ correctly because of frequent regime 
changes. Unlike countries that exhibit substantial political stability, where one may achieve 
measurement accuracy even if data are weak or absent for particular years, scholars will often 
not find easily available and useful data for coding cases with multiple periods of abrupt political 
change. Third, countries that combine features of democracy and features of authoritarianism are 
more difficult to classify. With these cases, separate measures are not highly correlated with one 
another and, thus, the absence of data for a single measure can jeopardize overall conclusions 
about the extent of democracy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Country and regional experts are often skeptical of the scores offered by large-N, over-time 
indices of democracy. They worry that these indices incorrectly score ―their‖ cases. This article 
provides an empirical basis for believing this skepticism is well founded. We demonstrate that 
the quality of the secondary data—and coder knowledge of those data—is a major problem that 
bedevils index construction. No matter how valid the conceptual, measurement, and 
aggregational properties, collecting adequate data to correctly code various indicators is 
inherently challenging and has led to serious error in the existing scales. 
 
We would like to close with a recommendation for creating future large-N indices of democracy. 
In the past, grant-funding agencies have sponsored cross-national data collection efforts led by a 
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 The correlation between economic development and democracy for a universal sample of 112 countries in 1990 is 
.59--GDP data from Mark 6.1 of the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002) and democracy scores from Polity IV 
(Marshall & Jaggers, 2002). If the democracy score for all 20 Latin American countries is changed to the highest 
possible value, the correlation is still .54; if the democracy score for those 20 countries is changed to 0, the 
correlation is still .64. 
single principle investigator who works with graduate student research assistants and perhaps a 
small team of collaborators. We would suggest that this model has outlived its usefulness. An 
alternative and more effective approach would be to fund principle investigators who contact 
country specialists to answer questions about democracy. To be effective, these experts would 
have to not only help score the various indicators proposed by the principle investigator but also 
help him or her operationalize the concept itself in light of their case expertise. It is clear that this 
process is far more complicated than the approach used in the past. But the present article 
suggests that it may be feasible and, moreover, that it could substantially improve the validity of 
future indices by helping analysts avoid data-induced measurement error. 
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